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Abstract
Human rights abuses occur regularly around the world, affecting millions of people each
year. In the post-World War II era, a human rights movement helped create regional and
international human rights regimes. This thesis tries to assess the impact of international
human rights pressure on state compliance with international human rights norms and
conventions. In investigating the impact of human rights pressure on states, I hypothesize
that certain conditions are helpful. The first condition is the absence of a strong public
opinion and/or cultural sentiment against what the pressuring entities are trying to
achieve. The second condition is dependency: dependent countries are more vulnerable to
economic and military threats, and thus are more likely to comply with international
pressures. To support this hypothesis, I analyze human rights situations in one dependent
country, the Dominican Republic; and a rising power, China. This thesis concludes that
indeed, a strong public opinion and/or cultural sentiment militate against what the
pressuring entities are trying to achieve. Thus, international human rights campaigns need
domestic support as Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’ s seminal book Activists
Beyond Borders notes. Contrary to my assumption that small dependent states are more
susceptible to international human rights pressure, dependency did not play a significant
role in the case studied.

Chapter 1
Introduction
Human rights abuses occur regularly around the world, affecting millions of
people each year. In the post- World War II era, a human rights movement helped create
regional and international human rights regimes. Non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) formed part of a network of organizations working together on behalf of human
rights. The work of NGOs has made states’ repressive practices more visible and salient,
forcing states to respond and improve practices. There are numerous cases of successful
human rights advocacy around the world, such as the abolition of slavery, the case of the
disappeared in Argentina in the 1970s, and the campaign against foot binding in China.
But not every story is a story of success; at times the efforts of human rights pressure
groups have not resulted in an improved human rights situation. Take for example the use
of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war of 2013 and the continued practice of female
genital mutilation throughout Africa. In the latter case there has been improvement, but
much remains to be done. With millions of dollars invested annually to advocate for
human rights it is useful to know how much change this advocacy has produced. How
can we assess if human rights pressure is effective? And if so, can we determine what
factors contribute to its success or failure? Why do human rights violations persist despite
ongoing pressures for compliance with conventions and norms?
My aim in researching this topic is to understand the dynamics of international
human rights influence. If we can determine when and to what degree international
human rights pressure has an influence on what states do we will be better equipped to
formulate policy recommendations that can target the situations on the ground. Knowing
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what conditions hinder the success of a human rights campaign would give the
international community a valuable tool to better use its economic resources and man
power, to create smarter campaigns and ways in which it can negotiate with government
officials and other factions to effect the desired change in human rights. The study of the
impact of international human rights pressure will help us explain not only positive
changes in state behavior but also the persistence of norm violations.
In sum, what is the impact of international pressure on state compliance? Which
domestic factors mediate this influence? If international human rights pressure is
effective, why does noncompliance remain widespread? Alternatively, if international
pressure is ineffective, why have a growing number of transnational actors increased
dramatically their pressure on noncompliant states? Understanding the complex ways in
which states respond to human rights pressure could solve part of this puzzle. The subject
has implications for what we know about the prospects for human rights reform, the
impact of international norms, and, more broadly still, the nature of state sovereignty. If
states respond in complex and often contradictory ways to international human rights
pressure, how can those applying such pressures hope to enhance their influence? The
conventional answer has been to increase human rights pressure, including by
strengthening domestic proponents of international norms. How we think about
compliance and the impact of international pressure is essential for devising more
effective human rights policies.
Although the rising consensus on global standards has yet to render the
enforcement of human rights any easier, no one denies the growing importance of human
rights to an emerging international order.
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Chapter 2
Research Design
In investigating the impact of human rights pressure on states, I hypothesize that
certain conditions are helpful. The first condition is the absence of a strong public
opinion and/or cultural sentiment against what the pressuring entities are trying to
achieve. The second condition is dependency: dependent countries are more vulnerable to
economic and military threats, and thus are more likely to comply with international
pressures. My first assumption is based on previous research by Keck and Sikkink that
argues that international pressure is likely to succeed when members of a domestic
society support international norms and join transnational networks of activists.1
According to Keck and Sikkink, human rights reform occurs when international and
domestic norms converge; therefore compliance is as much the result of pressures from
“below” as from “above.” If a strong civil society and participation in international
human rights networks create the conditions for reform, then public opinion against
human rights could hinder the success of human rights pressure groups.
The second assumption is based on the literature on dependency. The ability of a
powerful nation to influence the foreign policy behavior of a weaker nation has long been
recognized. According to Bruce Moon, dependent relationships occur between countries
when a powerful state influences the foreign policy choices of a weak state, and the two
countries engage in bargaining that is severely limited. Furthermore, he argues that such a
dependency relationship “creates distortions in the social and political system of the
weaker states which brings to power an elite whose interests, values and perceptions have
1

Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in
International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 15.
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more in common with the elites of the powerful nation than with the masses in their own
country.”2 Therefore I ask, under which conditions will a weak state not give in to the
influence of a powerful state? How can we explain noncompliance from weak states?
To answer these questions I will be using two countries as case studies: the
Dominican Republic and China. The Dominican Republic and China were chosen for this
analysis because they are premier examples of countries that have been under great
international pressure to reform their human rights practices. These countries also provide
an important contrast given that the Dominican Republic is a small dependent state and
China is a rising power. Small states are usually more vulnerable to international
pressures, therefore contrasting the events in the Dominican Republic to those in China
will allow me to compare the different dynamics that are at play when a small state is
targeted versus a big power. This is the second part of my hypothesis.
I will begin by discussing the existing literature on the impact of human rights
pressure, including previous research on compliance with international norms. I will then
examine the domestic factors that affect compliance in my case studies, focusing on
domestic public opinion, culture and economic dependence.
Definitions
In order to address the effectiveness of human rights pressure it is important to
first define how the term human rights will be employed throughout this paper. The idea
of internationally protected human rights was placed on the international agenda when
the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in 1948. The UN defines human rights as rights inherent to all human beings,
2

Bruce E. Moon. “The Foreign Policy of the Dependent State.” International Studies
Quarterly. Vol. 27. No. 3 (September 1983). Pp. 315-340.
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whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, color, religion,
language, or any other status.3 We are all entitled to our human rights without
discrimination. The notion of human rights was expanded in 1976 when the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) were enacted. The ICCPR commits its
parties to respect an individual’s right to life, freedom of religion, freedom of speech,
freedom of assembly and rights to due process and a fair trial. The ICESCR commits its
parties to work toward the granting of labor rights, the right to education and the right to
an adequate standard of living.
Hawkins defines human rights pressures as “nonviolent activities carried out by
transnational networks and states with the primary purpose of improving individual rights
by creating economic and political costs for a repressive government.”4 States pressure
other states to change their human rights practices through diplomatic channels either
bilaterally or multilaterally. Human rights pressure groups are networks of NGOs that are
part of the human rights movement, and work together with regional intergovernmental
organizations and private foundations on behalf of human rights. International
organizations develop formal procedures to discuss and investigate human rights
situations in member states, and NGOs make states’ repressive practices more visible and
salient, thus forcing states that otherwise would remain silent to respond.

3

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations 1948
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Darren G. Hawkins. International Human Rights and Authoritarian Rule in Chile
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), p. 20.
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Literature Review
Research about human rights has been focused on explaining the emergence of
international regimes and the application of human rights pressure on states. Scholars
have been particularly interested in the formation of norms. According to this perspective,
the impact human rights can have depends on the strength of international norms. Martha
Finnemore, for example, adopts such an approach to show how states have intervened
with growing historical frequency to protect human rights abroad.5 She argues that the
growing willingness of states to use force on behalf of human rights reflects rising
acceptance of international norms of humanitarian intervention. Jack Donnelly goes
beyond the concept of acceptance of international norms and argues that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights has shaped society in the image of the rights that it
enumerates. “Just as individuals ‘nature’ or ‘character’ arises from the interaction of
natural endowment, social and environmental influences, and individual action, human
beings create their ‘essential’ nature through social action on themselves. Human rights
provide both a substantive model and a set of practices to realize this work of selfcreation.”6 These arguments are liberal in nature, but have been reinterpreted by
constructivism, which considers norms to be the product of socialization. In international
relations theory, constructivists understand the world as coming into being through a
process of interaction between agents (individuals, states, non-state actors) and the
structures of their broader environment. In terms of human rights, constructivists trace

5

Martha Finnemore. The Purpose of intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of
Force (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003).
6

Jack Donnelly. Universal Human Rights in Theory and in Practice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2013). p. 15.
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state interest to a set of principled ideas and practices, such as the international normative
context and transnational networks. This approach highlights the role of socialization in
driving the effects of international human rights pressure on state actions.
One of the most influential and groundbreaking works to emerge in this area of
literature in the past few years is Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink’s work, entitled The Power of
Human Rights: Institutional Norms and Domestic Change. In this seminal work the
authors lay out a theoretical framework for norm socialization, a process whereby human
rights norms become internalized, “so that external pressure is no longer needed to ensure
compliance.”7 The spiral model for globalization of human rights norms has explanatory
power and value. Not only can it explain much of what we observe in terms of the respect
for human rights in the world today, it can explain various levels of violation and abuse
of these human rights as well. The spiral model consists of five stages:
1. State repression
2. Denial of oppression
3. Tactical concessions
4. Internationalization of human rights norms
5. Rule-consistent behavior
In fact, nearly every country in the world can be placed into one of these five phases.
In contrast to constructivism, realism is a long-lived approach in international
relations. Realists look at what the group’s interests are, and the role that power
relationships play in reconciling clashing interests. Although realists tend to generalize

7

Thomas Rise, Steven Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink. The Power of Human Rights:
International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 1999), p. 11.
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about human rights advocates with charges of idealism and sentimentality, such
arguments overlook the fact that human rights fit comfortably into a realist’s world
defined by interests and anarchy. As Cyrus Vance said in explaining the Carter
administration’s human rights policy to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:
“The advancement of human rights is more than an ideal. It, too, is an interest. It realizes
peaceful gains for freedom and also steps toward stability abroad, and greater security for
America.”8 When human rights abuses could degrade the legitimacy of a partnership,
rupture the stability of a country, or threaten political processes where a country has
critical interests at stake, it is in that country’s interest to at least consider how it might
deal with the issue of human rights in word and deed.
Some claim that compliance will be greatest when international pressure is
applied by a hegemonic state and the target state is weak internationally.9 Realists
believe in the power of coercive sanctions, whether applied through interstate bargaining
or issue linkages. The basic argument is that human rights compliance is most likely
when states make their broader military or economic relations contingent on state
performance.10 I will test this by looking at the case of the Dominican Republic. The
combination of human rights criticism with dependence on foreign aid and investment
can be crucial in lessening repression.

8

Daniel R. Mahanty, Oct 9, 2013 “Realists, Too, Can Stand for Human Rights.”
Accessed 3/2/14. http://nationalinterest.org
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Stephen Krasner. “Sovereignty, Regimes and Human Rights.” Regime Theory and
International Relations. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
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While material sanctions made through foreign aid disbursements or preferential
trade agreements are a potential source of influence on human rights-violating
governments, a great deal of activity by the global human rights network involves public
condemnations of a government’s human rights abuses.11 Shaming refers to when human
rights organizations use information about human rights abuses in the popular media to
pressure or “shame” a state regarding its human rights record. Shaming seeks to convince
leaders that their behavior is inconsistent with an identity to which they aspire. In a study
that examined how governments that are targeted for human rights criticism respond to
subsequent contentious challenges, James C. Franklin found that human rights criticism
does lead governments to reduce repression in cases where there are relatively strong
economic ties to other countries.12 This result shows that countries with greater ties to the
outside world, and hence more to lose, tend to be more sensitive to their international
human rights reputation. Similarly, Murdie and Davis found that states targeted by human
rights international non-governmental organizations often do improve their human rights
practices.13
In a democracy, governments are supposed to be responsive to the public. That is
to say, the opinions of people living within a democratic state are expected to be reflected
in government policy. The press is a major source of the public’s information on human
rights conditions and, therefore, a major force in shaping public opinion on the topic. In a
11

James Franklin. “Shame on You: The Impact of Human Rights Criticism on Political
Repression in Latin America,” International Studies Quarterly 52 (2008): pp. 187-211.
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Amanda Murdie and David Davis. “Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to
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study that examined if human rights international organizations had an impact on public
opinion, Davies et al found that human rights organizations (HROs) provide information
to citizens in repressive regimes about their government’s human rights practices.14 This
study suggests that HROs impact domestic public opinion regarding a state’s respect for
human rights.
On the other hand, in a study that analyzed public support for international human
rights institutions, Min Zhou found that public support for global institutionalization of
human rights is not universal and may be related to broader social context.15 Zhou notes
that people with certain social, economic, and demographic characteristics are more
likely to show support for international human rights institutions. For instance, in China
the level of support decreases as the level of education attained rises. The declining level
of support could be related to the notion of western proprietorship of human rights. This
notion puts the global movement at risk because it may render obsolete the developing
global culture of human rights. Developing countries and non-liberal states often criticize
human rights advocates as invasive of sovereignty, the result of imbalances of power.
In arguments about human rights there are two well-known claims that dominate
the discussion. First, there are those who argue that human rights are universal, and then
there are those who claim cultural relativism in human rights. Proponents of universality
claim that human rights are universal and there should be no exceptions in light of

14

David Davis, Amanda Murdie and Coty Garnett Steinmetz. “ ‘Makers and Shapers’:
Human Rights INGOs and Public Opinion,” Human Rights Quarterly Vol. 34, No. 1
(2013): pp. 199-224.
15
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cultural or historical differences. For relativists, moral values, and thus conceptions about
human rights are determined by history, culture and economics. In discussing the
argument that moral values are historically or culturally specific rather than universal,
Donnelly says that there are “three worlds” of human rights. The “Western” approach
emphasizes civil and political rights and the right to private property. The “socialist”
approach emphasizes economic and social rights. The “third world” approach emphasizes
self-determination and economic development.16
Sonia Cardenas, in explaining human rights reform and compliance, suggests that
national security threats, pro-violation constituencies, and domestic rules of exception or
exclusion are important factors in mediating the influence of international human rights
pressure on state behavior. 17 According to Cardenas, a state’s violation of international
norms can depend on the support of pro-violation constituencies who can reside inside or
outside the state apparatus. The author argues that international and domestic human
rights pressures can have both direct and indirect effects. On the one hand, human rights
pressures can lead directly to human rights commitments. This is because human rights
pressure alters a state’s interest in appearing compliant, regardless of whether it actually
violates international norms. Consequently, states will respond to human rights pressure
by ratifying international agreements, acting with leniency in specific cases, providing
access to international monitors, implementing international norms domestically, or even
occasionally holding abusers accountable. On the other hand, as long as certain

16

Jack Donnelly. International Human Rights (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998) p.
35.
17

Sonia Cardenas. Conflict and Compliance: State Responses to International Human
Rights Pressure (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), p. 25.
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conditions exist- national threats, pro-violation constituencies, and rules of exceptionstates will continue to violate international norms even in the face of international and
domestic human rights pressures.
Much of the literature, therefore, suggests a relationship between the domestic
environment and the success of international pressures. In the rest of the thesis, I examine
two cases to see if the relationship holds.

12

Chapter 3
Case Study: The Dominican Republic
The Dominican Republic, because of its small size and its relatively minor
position in the order of international power, presents a good case to study in terms of its
vulnerability to human rights international pressures. The Dominican Republic has often
depended on foreign investment for capital, and as a country that has been occupied by
the U.S. twice, it is a nation not totally in complete control of its destiny. Therefore I ask:
is there a particular issue on which the Dominican Republic has been widely perceived as
violating human rights? If so, has international pressure been brought to bear and has it
been successful? Finally, if not, why not? Is it a matter of public opinion, or culture?
A Major Human Rights Issue
In order to understand the human rights issue, I have chosen the Dominican
Republic’s decision in 2013 to denationalize Haitian residents. Before we get to the
details of the case, some background on the subject is necessary. The Dominican
Republic is situated in the Caribbean in the chain of islands called the Greater Antilles.
Of more geographic significance is the fact that the Dominican Republic is in a rather
unique position in that it shares the island of Hispaniola with Haiti. Christopher
Columbus landed on the north-coast of present day Haiti on Christmas day, 1492.
Thinking that they had reached the far east, Columbus’ party erected a makeshift fort and
began the process of establishing a Spanish presence in the New World. Santo Domingo
became the first permanent Spanish settlement in the Americas. The failure or
unwillingness of the Spanish to control the attacks by the French and English prompted
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Spain to cede the western third of the island to France under the terms of the Treaty of
Ryswick in 1697. The French- controlled western third of the island developed quickly
into what many considered to be the richest colony in the world at that time. Relying
upon over 500,000 slaves imported from Africa, the French led the world in the
exportation of sugar, coffee, cocoa and other agricultural commodities.1
In 1795, Spain ceded the eastern part of the island to France, as the war in Europe
with Spain gave the French the opportunity to take over the rest of the island. Following a
slave revolt led by Jean Jacques Dessalines, the Haitian rebels defeated the French army
and declared Haiti independent in 1804-the first independent republic in the western
hemisphere with a majority population of African descent. All Haitians regardless of skin
color were declared noir/e under the Constitution of 1805. In 1822, the Haitian President
Jean-Pierre Boyer invaded and occupied the eastern part of the island (present day
Dominican Republic). The atrocities committed by the Haitian army formed an important
historical basis for popular anti-Haitian sentiment in the Dominican Republic. The period
from 1822 to 1844 is remembered in Dominican history, to this day, as “the Haitian
domination,” a parenthesis in the development of native institutions during which alien
laws based on unfamiliar principles turned social and political life upside down.2
The Haitian occupation lasted from 1822 to 1844. Despite emancipation of the
slaves, Dominican politics remained restricted to a small, mainly white elite. In 1844, this
elite declared independence from Haiti. After independence the two countries developed
important economic and political differences, one of the main ones being the political
1

Emilio Cordero Michel. La Revolucion Haitiana y Santo Domingo (Santo Domingo:
Editora Nacional, 1968).
2

Ibid., pp. 25-30.
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instability that has affected Haiti throughout the 20th century, although the Dominican
Republic’s stability has rested on authoritarianism. A study conducted to assess the
growth divergence of the Dominican Republic and Haiti concluded that while both
countries share similarities in terms of geography and historical institutions, policy
decisions since 1960 have played a central role in the growth divergence between Haiti
and the Dominican Republic, in particular economic policies.3 A comparison of socioeconomic indices illustrates quite substantial differences.
Table 3.1 Comparative Indices Dominican Republic and Haiti, 2012

Source: World Bank country data, 2014 (http://data.worldbank.org)
Two nations with vastly different heritages occupying one island is certainly an
oddity, but the geographic uniqueness of Hispaniola is more than just the fact that two
countries share the same parcel of land. Over the years, the Dominican Republic and
Haiti have not been good neighbors, and in fact have been unwilling to gloss over their
racial, economic, political and cultural differences, choosing instead to avoid contact and
to keep age-old grudges at center stage. According to Kryzanek and Wiarda, the long
3

Laura Jaramillo and Cemile Sancak. “Why Has the Grass Been Greener on One Side of
Hispaniola? A Comparative Growth Analysis of the Dominican Republic and Haiti,” IMF
staff papers, 2009 Vol. 56, No. 2.
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period of Haitian domination of the Dominican Republic during the 19th century, the
exodus of illegal Haitian immigrants into Dominican territory, and the constant fear of
excessive “darkening” and “Africanizing” of Dominican society by the Haitians has
created a definite anti-Haitian climate in the Dominican Republic.4 Anti-Haitianism
combines a legacy of racist Spanish colonial mentality, nineteenth century racial theories,
and twentieth century cultural racism into a web of anti-Haitian attitudes, stereotypes and
historical distortions.5
In describing anti-Haitianism, Teresita Martinez-Vergne contends that a key
element of anti-Haitianism is the accusation of racial exclusivism, of isolation and antiEuropeanism. According to her, in this respect, Dominicans would always point to
Haiti’s birth as the result of a race war in which, according to the common wisdom, the
savage destroyed the civilized. For this reason, blacks and mulattoes in Haiti hated each
other and continued to fight, condemning the country to material poverty. Dominicans,
according to their own account, welcomed racial mixture and did not obsess about it,
while Haitians prohibited confraternization. Because of the Dominican Republic’s
“cosmopolitanism,” Haiti would always resent its eastern neighbor and try to neutralize
it.6

4

Michael J. Kryzanek and Howard J. Wiarda. “The Politics of External Influence in the
Dominican Republic,” (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988).
5

Daly Guilamo. “Dominican Funnies, Not So Funny: The Representation of Haitians in
Dominican Newspaper Comic Strips, After the 2010 Earthquake.” Journal of Pan
African Studies, Vol.5, No. 9, March 2013. pp. 63-82.
6

Teresita Martinez-Vergne. “Race in the Formation of Nationality.” Nation & Citizen in
the Dominican Republic, 1880-1916 (Chapel Hill, N.C: University of North Carolina
Press, 2005), p. 95.
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Haitians began to arrive in Dominican cane fields late in the first decade of the
twentieth century and were actively recruited as workers only after the U.S occupation of
the island in 1916.7 The development of the sugar cane industry after World War I and
the use of Haitian labor in this sector shaped the migration patterns of Haitians to the
Dominican Republic. The destruction of the European beet-sugar industry created the
opportunity for the Dominican Republic to become a major sugar producer. In order to
satisfy the demand for labor, the United States initiated the practice of recruiting Haitians
to work on Dominican sugar plantations. Reliance on Haitian labor in the sugar industry
continued after the United States withdrew from the country in 1924, and Haitians
became an exploited, yet stable supply of workers.8
During the occupation a national constabulary was created to maintain order after
the marines left. It was from this marine trained National Guard that the Dominican
Republic would see the rise of their next leader, Rafael L. Trujillo, who established one
of the most brutal dictatorships in Latin America. In a sense Trujillo’s regime is a lasting
legacy of the U.S. occupation.9 Trujillo came to power in 1931 and for thirty-one years
maintained a strong hold on Dominican society. According to David Howard, Trujillo
used his power from 1930 to 1961, to pursue his anti-Haitian agenda and embarked on a
program of “dominicanization” of the country, a nationalist program aimed at redefining

7

Teresita Martinez-Vergne. “Race in the Formation of Nationality.” Nation & Citizen in
the Dominican Republic, 1880-1916 (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press,
2005), p. 93.
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Dominican identity as white.10 The most brutal example of this policy came in 1937
when he ordered the massacre of around 18,000 Haitians and dark-skinned Dominicans
who resided in the border area. Continued expulsions of Haitians were carried out by the
Dominican military during the following decades, and an intense religious and
educational campaign was pursued in the border areas.11
With the assassination of Trujillo in 1961 a period of instability ensued that
culminated in the April revolution of 1965 and the U.S. occupation to contain it. After the
U.S. occupation in 1965, Trujillo’s disciple, Joaquin Balaguer became president and
started what Howard has termed a new era of “dominicanization.”12 In 1983, Balaguer
published La Isla al Revés, in which he outlined the demographic threat from an
expanding Haitian population and argued that nationality can never be granted or
exchanged, only inherited.13 Joaquin Balaguer maintained power through fraudulent
elections for thirty years, letting go of control, only after international pressure, for two
terms between 1978 and 1986.
Howard points out that the politics of the 1990s was marked by the development
of an intensely racialized political discourse, when the mayor of Santo Domingo, José
Francisco Peña Gómez became the presidential candidate for the Dominican
Revolutionary Party, el Partido de la Revolucion Dominicana (PRD), and leader of the
main opposition party. Peña Gómez had suffered racial slurs during the elections in 1982
10

David Howard. Coloring the Nation, Race and Ethnicity in the Dominican Republic,
(United Kingdom: Signal Books Limited, 2001).
11

Ibid., p. 157.
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Editora Corripio, 1993).
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as a candidate to be mayor, but not to the extent as he did in the 1994 and 1996
presidential campaigns.14 The attack against Peña Gómez suggested that his Haitian
ancestry made him an improper, and potentially untrustworthy, candidate for the
presidency. He was born to Haitian immigrants in 1937 and adopted as an infant by a
Dominican peasant family when his parents were forced to flee back to Haiti as Trujillo
enacted the massacre of Haitians that same year.15
In 1994, Peña Gómez ran against Balaguer, who orchestrated one of the biggest
election frauds in Dominican history to stop his opponent from getting to office. The
scale of the fraud received international media coverage. International pressure led to an
agreement between the political parties, limiting Balaguer’s term to eighteen months,
later extended to two years after political maneuvering.16
In 1996, Peña Gómez ran against Leonel Fernández and Jacinto Peynado. With an
80 percent turnout on May 16, the leading vote getters were Peña Gómez, with 45.94
percent, and Fernández with 39.94 percent. The ruling party’s candidate, Peynado,
mustered only 14.99 percent.17 Balaguer decided not to endorse his party’s nominee and
instead endorsed the young newcomer, Fernández. Despite being from an opposition
party, Fernández, a mulatto, shared Balaguer’s conservative, anti-communist stance that
made him attractive to Balaguer. Balaguer made public calls to support “a real

14
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Dominican” candidate versus the Haitian one.18 His public rallying proved effective when
Fernández was declared the winner of the second round of elections. International
observers upheld the legitimacy of both rounds.19 The fear of Haitian influence, and the
possible fusion of the island under Haitian dominance, prompted the formation of a
patriotic front to block Peña Gómez from gaining the presidency, first through fraud and
then through an unlikely pact between opposing parties. For the controlling elite it was
unacceptable that a dark-skinned Dominican could become president of the country.20
During Fernández’ presidency, first in 1996-2000, and then 2004-2012 the
deportation of Haitian immigrants and the irregularities in the birth registration of
Dominicans of Haitian descent caught international attention. In early 1997, the
Dominican Republic again launched a sweeping campaign to expel undocumented
Haitians. In two months, an estimated 25,000 suspected Haitians were expelled from the
country.21 A massive deportation campaign in November 1999 resulted in the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights issuing precautionary measures against the
Dominican Republic. The commission’s order called upon the Dominican authorities to
ease the mass expulsion of foreigners, and to respect due process norms in conducting
future deportations. It is difficult to establish an average deportation rate, but a network
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of organizations that monitors the border estimates they go over the ten thousand mark
each year. 22 For details see the chart below.
Table 3.2 Deportations of Haitian Immigrants from the Dominican Republic

Source: Groupe d’Appui aux Rapatriés et Refugiés (Support group for deportees and
refugees), 2009 Annual Report.

In 2005, Dilcia Yean and Violeta Bosico, two girls of Haitian descent born in the
Dominican Republic, sued the Dominican Republic in the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights. The Dominican registry office refused to issue birth certificates for the
children even though the Dominican constitution in effect at that time recognized every
child born in the Dominican territory as a Dominican citizen. The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights filed an application with the Inter-American Court of
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Human Rights, alleging that the Dominican government’s discriminatory policies had
rendered Yean and Bosico stateless and forced them to live in very vulnerable
circumstances. The Court ordered the Dominican Republic to issue the girls’ birth
certificates and to take the necessary steps to ensure non-discrimination against children
born in the Dominican Republic to Haitian parents. While voting in favor of the adoption
of the judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Judge A.A Cançado
Trindade submitted a separate opinion to emphasize the importance of the case because it
was the first time in its history that the Inter-American Court ruled in the right to
nationality under the American Convention on Human Rights. In his separate opinion
Judge Cançado stated, “the issues of nationality cannot be considered merely from the
perspective of the state’s discretional authority, because general principles of
international law are involved, such as the obligation to protect.”23
In 2010 the Dominican Republic amended its Constitution to change its statute on
the granting of citizenship. Prior to 2010 the Dominican constitution granted citizenship
on the basis of jus soli, or the right of being born on the land. This new amendment
granted citizenship on the basis of, jus sanguini, or right of blood, thus granting
Dominican citizenship to people born to Dominican nationals. With this move the
government sought to silence the international critics that demanded Dominican
nationality for those born in the Dominican Republic regardless of their Haitian ancestry.
On September 23, 2013 the Dominican Republic’s Constitutional Court found
that the provision on citizenship in the 1929 Dominican constitution, which recognizes as
a citizen anyone born in the country, should not apply to the children of parents who were
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not “legal residents” at the time of their birth, on the basis that their parents were “in
transit.” It further ruled that as a result these children, and subsequent generations born on
Dominican soil, are excluded from the citizenship guarantee provided by the
constitution.24 The Court’s decision effectively strips citizenship rights from the
descendants of Haitian migrants who settled in the Dominican Republic from the start of
the 20th century, despite the fact that the current constitution declares as Dominican
anyone who enjoyed Dominican citizenship prior to 2010. The vast majority of these
individuals will be left stateless. This ruling threatens a massive denationalization that
will have a potentially devastating impact on hundreds of thousands of Dominican
citizens. It risks rendering tens of thousands of people stateless, and excluding them from
basic state services including access to health care and education.25
According to legal analysts, the Court decision directly defies the 2005 judgment
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In Yean & Bosico v. Dominican Republic,
the Inter-American Court had ruled that the migratory status of the parents can never
constitute justification for the deprivation of nationality and that children cannot inherit
the migratory status of their parents. At that time the court observed, “To consider that a
person is in transit, irrespective of the classification used, the State must respect a
reasonable temporal limit and understand that a foreigner who develops connections in a
State cannot be equated to a person in transit.”26 In contrast, the constitutional court, in
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direct violation of the Inter-American Court’s ruling, uses the concept of in transit to
define the status of the immigrants and descendants of immigrants that have lived in the
country for decades.
Legal analysts also note that the 2013 ruling also provides a highly disturbing
procedure for its implementation that would constitute a breach of international
prohibitions against racial and ethnic discrimination. It proposes the identification and
listing of all citizens of “foreign origin” from the Dominican Civil Registry and the
creation of a second list for those who under the new criteria given by the court are
considered to be mistakenly registered as Dominicans. The names of people listed in this
new regime will then be administratively transferred to foreigners’ books and notified to
the foreign ministry so that the ministry can inform the affected individuals and the
supposed correspondent embassy. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
pointed out that these procedures ordered in the constitutional court’s ruling clearly
violate the Dominican Republic’s obligations under well-established human rights
principles, particularly the universal anti-discrimination norm.27
As noted above, the UNHCR criticized the judgment, noting also that the
Dominican Republic is a party to the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination (ICERD) and as such has human rights obligations to ensure
equal protection before the law as in the granting of nationality. The UNHCR regional
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representative, Shelly Pitterman, also noted that it is a basic principle of international law
that no one should be deprived of a nationality if that action leads to statelessness.28
International Pressure
My hypothesis is that states will only ignore international pressure for reasons of
culture and strong public opinion. I will now focus on the international pressure that has
been applied to the Dominican Republic in this case. The international community has
been quick to express its contempt for the Court ruling. Like other organizations, the
Caribbean Community (Caricom) has put the Dominican Republic’s accession
application, which was in process, on hold pending the country’s revocation of the Court
ruling.29 In the United States, the Congressional Black Caucus issued a statement
expressing its concern for the human rights impact of the ruling.30 Moreover, various
human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and Oxfam international, all
expressed deep concern for the application of the Court’s decision and advocated for a
solution for all those affected.31 This international criticism was met with responses that
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appealed to sovereignty and nationalism. President Danilo Medina reiterated the
country’s right to establish its citizenship laws, while at the same time he acknowledged
that those denationalized are living a human drama.
At the official level, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights carried
out a country visit in December 2013 to assess the impact of the denationalization
ordered by the Court’s decision. In terms of bilateral pressures, the President of
Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro presided over a meeting between the Dominican President
Danilo Medina, and Haitian President Michel Martelly in a bilateral push to get the two
countries to discuss possible solutions for those stripped of their citizenship. Since the
first meeting in December the talks have continued but not much progress has been
attained. The Vice President of the United States, Joe Biden was scheduled to visit the
Dominican Republic in March 2014, as the last stop on his trip throughout Latin
America. During this visit Biden was expected to discuss the issue of denationalization
with President Medina, but because of the urgency of the Crimean crisis on 2014, he cut
his trip short and at the time of this writing his trip had not been re-scheduled.32
An online petition created by a movement that represents the people affected by
the Court decision, quickly spread through social media sites like Facebook and Twitter,
gained thousands of signatures and started spreading the word about those affected by the
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ruling.33 Social media has played an important role as a platform through which people
can express and share ideas. Most importantly, the Arab Spring in 2011 demonstrated the
power of social media in gathering like-minded individuals to push for democracy. In the
case of the Dominican Republic’s Court ruling, it has also proven to be an effective
method for civil society organizations and individuals to let the world know what is
happening on the ground.
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink speak about a “boomerang effect,” in which
activists appeal to the international community to act on domestic situations.34 In this
case, Facebook posts, tweets and hashtags have been the tools used to bring the issue to
the international community’s attention. One of the popular hashtags for the campaign
against the Court’s ruling has been #DroitsHumainsRD, or human rights DR. This
hashtag became a trend when a group of young people organized a protest at an airport in
Montreal. The protesters set a beach-like scene in which a white woman with a bikini is
seen tanning and her hands are covered in red paint to simulate blood. The purpose of the
protest was to hit the Dominican Republic’s $4.5 billion dollar tourism industry, and it
was accompanied by numerous articles published online that suggested that people
vacation somewhere else to punish the country for its human rights violations.35
33
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However, there have been no reports of decline in the country’s tourism activities as of
mid-2014, which suggests that this kind of economic attacks have not yet been
successful.
In my hypothesis I consider that certain conditions are necessary for international
human rights pressure to be effective. One of the conditions is economic and military
dependence: dependent countries are more vulnerable to economic and military threats,
and thus are more likely to comply with international pressures. The Dominican Republic
has not received any economic or military threats from other countries, but given the
international attention it has received, one assumes that the country’s economic and
military vulnerabilities might make it comply with international pressure. For example,
Kryzanek and Wiarda point out that the U.S. government has historically had an
influence in the Dominican military. They argue that most of the assistance provided by
the U.S. to the Dominican military has been in two categories- Foreign Military Sales
(FMS), a program through which weapons and equipment are distributed, and the
Military Assistance Program (MAP) which grants or lends defense articles, services and
training.36
In an article published on the magazine The Nation, Todd Miller describes the
relationship between the specialized border security corps, called CESFRONT, or
commonly known as the Dominican border patrol, and the American military. According
to Miller, the Dominican Republic created its border patrol in 2006 after a group of U.S.
experts reported that there were a “series of weaknesses that will lead to all kinds of illicit
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activities” on the Haitian-Dominican border.37 The U.S. team recommended, “There
should be helicopters deployed in the region and a Border Guard should be created.” 38 A
month after their report appeared, the CESFRONT was created. Given the relationship
between the Dominican military and the U.S. government, if the U.S. threatened to
renegotiate the terms of the partnership, or more drastically to temporarily suspend
training and funding, the Dominican government would be pushed to reconsider its
position.
In terms of economic threats, the Dominican economy is highly dependent upon
the U.S., the destination for more than half of its exports, and remittances from the U.S.
amount to about one-tenth of GDP, equivalent to almost half of exports and threequarters of tourism receipts. In addition, the country suffers from marked income
inequality and struggles with an unemployment rate of 15% in 2013.39 If we also take
into consideration that the country is part of the Central American Free Trade Agreement
(DR-CAFTA), and that it has historically sided with the U.S. in terms of diplomatic
matters (to the extent of contributing troops to the war in Iraq) it is not a far-fetched
assumption to believe that if the U.S. were to pull the strings the Dominican government
would respond.
The European Union is also one of the Dominican Republic’s biggest donors. In
2013, it donated $66,180 million euros for various aid projects to the Dominican
37
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government.40 Furthermore, Antonio Vargas, the Director of multilateral cooperation said
that even though many countries have manifested their contempt for the Court ruling, the
Dominican government has been able to convince the European governments of the need
for the projects they are funding, and thus avert the link of aid to compliance.41 In sum,
international pressure has not been as strong as expected, and it has not been effective so
far.
The Domestic Environment: Explanations for the Lack of Effectiveness of
International Pressure
Public Opinion
My hypothesis is that international pressure works only when the domestic
environment is conducive to it. Even If the international pressure has not been strong, the
Dominican Republic could hardly adopt such a policy without domestic support. In fact,
there has been strong nationalist sentiment in support of the Court’s decision. The elite
has been instrumental in framing the issue as a matter of Haitian immigration instead of
an issue of stripping of citizenship from those who had already received it. This
disinformation or manipulation of the facts has created a divide in public opinion about
the matter. For instance, a group of self-titled “Intellectuals in support of the Dominican
Republic” published a letter condemning The Company of Jesus, a regional Jesuit
organization, for their position in opposing the Court decision. In the letter, the
“intellectuals” claim that the Court decision does not strip the citizenship of Dominicans
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of Haitian descent, but instead gives the Dominican government the right to investigate
the cases of those who obtained their documentation fraudulently, and that allows the
government to stop this practice and punish the responsible individuals.42
Another view that has been popularized in the mass media has been that the Court
ruling does not denationalize those who have Dominican nationality, but instead the
Court has simply ordered the implementation of a “plan de regularizacion nacional,” an
immigration bill that would control the flow of undocumented Haitians to the Dominican
Republic.43 Consuelo Despradel, a well-known journalist who hosts a radio and a
television show, has used her image in the media to echo that argument and to organize
protests against those who according to her are “damaging the country’s international
image.”44 The constant presence of well-known public figures in the media presenting
these kinds of arguments has played a big role in the public’s perception about the
situation. Some polls show widespread support for the Court decision, others slight
support, and one of the most interesting, finds that 62 percent of the population think the
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Court ruling is not anti-Haitian.45 This finding represents the belief of many Dominicans
that there is no such thing as discrimination in the country.
According to Kryzanek and Wiarda, the “quiet power,” or the elite, in the
Dominican Republic is actually an amalgam of the business, professional, and
landowning elite that has consistently operated most effectively in the shadows of
national politics.46 In fact, because the Dominican Republic is a small country with a vast
web of interfamily relationships that cross economic, social, and political lines, the
opinions of elite members on public policy issues can easily reach the National Palace or
the various governmental bureaucracies. This group has put its power to work to back the
government and label those opposed to the Court’s ruling as “traitors of the homeland.”
Interestingly, the Cardinal of Santo Domingo, Nicolás de Jésus López Rodríguez, a
regular figure in all political discussions, has also used his power to condemn those that
are not supporting the government, a position that prompted Pope Francis to send him a
public letter reminding him to advocate for the disenfranchised and those who live in the
margins of society.47
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The civil society groups that have organized to advocate against denationalization
have united forces under ideas of respect for human rights, diversity and solidarity. One
of the organizations leading the opposition against the Court decision is Centro Bono, a
Jesuit organization that works closely with Haitian immigrants. The organization has
organized protests, press conferences with legal scholars that analyze the Court decision,
and other events in which those affected can tell their stories. One such event was called
“abrazos solidarios”48 and its organizers invited everyone opposed to the Court decision
to meet the affected and commit to advocate for them; they also suggested giving them a
hug, as an expression of solidarity in the face of the hatred they are experiencing.49 Other
organizations, like the student groups “Reconocido” and “Dominicano como tu”
(“Recognized” and “Dominican like you”) have focused on organizing peaceful protests
and conducting workshops for those affected to understand the implications of the Court
ruling.50 While these groups have been able to raise awareness and gather more support,
they have not been successful in influencing a change in the government’s
implementation of the Court ruling.
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Culture in the Dominican Republic: The Influence of Anti-Haitianism
The Constitutional Court’s decision has put the Dominican Republic in the
spotlight, and not in a good way, given that countries rarely welcome criticism from
abroad. This situation has affected the country’s international image and it threatens its
relations with the international community. In the context of my hypothesis, why would
the government of the Dominican Republic not change its position even if the public
supports it? In this section I analyze the historic and cultural background that has led the
Dominican Republic to maintain its adamant position, in spite of the pressures to comply
with international norms and treaties.
As described in the beginning of this chapter, anti-Haitianism was “the nectar that
nourished-and continues to nourish-nationalism in the Dominican Republic.”51 MartinezVergne says that historians have examined the periodic outbursts of “nationalist”
sentiment in the Dominican Republic in an attempt to grasp its roots. She expands this
noting that one sizable group of authors explains anti-Haitianism as a function of the
efforts of the dominant classes to remain firmly at the top of the hierarchy.52 Another
explanation for anti-Haitianism, less directly pertinent to my study, is the development of
world capitalism. The unequal development of both parts of the island, that is, the growth
of Saint Domingue into a plantation economy, allowed for a more conflictive and
eventually destructive relationship between African slaves and masters. On the other
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hand, the Dominican Republic, which had reverted to subsistence farming and cattle
raising, developed more harmonious race relations and, conceivably, a more egalitarian
society and form of government.53
According to Teresita Martinez-Vergne, Dominicans at the turn of the century
were careful to deny that they disdained Haitians because they were black. Rather, they
insisted, the differences that made the two peoples incompatible resided in “culture”language, religion, body of laws, and social practices, including voodoo and cannibalism,
two “germs even more barbarian and solvent (of culture than race is)…which placed
Haiti at the very bottom of civilized nations.”54
Teresita Martinez-Vergne, continues, noting that Haitian policy was based on the
principle of the “indivisibility of the island” which in practice translated into attempts to
subjugate the Dominican Republic. This principle was in direct conflict with attempts to
affirm a Dominican nationality. As a result, once independence from Haiti was achieved,
there emerged a “fundamental, indestructible antagonism between the two peoples.”55
The creation of the Haitian state was based on exterminating “two races from its soil, the
white and the mixed.”56 This principle, while perhaps justified by previous events and by
the barrier to slavery that the Haitians wished to erect, served to alienate the Dominican
people. While Haiti developed a policy based on “the exclusivity of a single race,” the
black race, the Dominican Republic was supposedly guided by “cosmopolitanism, the
53
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expansion of all the races on its soil, although,” the author adds, “with a preference for
the white race.”57
According to Michael Baud, intellectuals and politicians throughout Dominican
history have sought to make others believe that they spoke on behalf of the people.
Conservative nationalists repeated time and again that they were merely voicing ideas
alive within the population.58 The author questions how seriously this everyday antiHaitianism should be taken, and whether it has been a constant component of popular
culture, if in the same countryside where children scare each other with tales of Haitian
witchcraft, adults work amicably together with Haitian workers. He concludes that such
working relations often lead to cordial personal relations.59
How can one explain the dichotomy between the rampant covert racism that is
held by the elite and people in government, and the everyday relations between Haitians
and Dominican workers? Baud explains that part of the answer is that authoritarian
nationalism in the Dominican Republic evoked the counterbalance of a more democratic
and flexible current of nationalist thought.60 This liberal nationalism was less powerful
and lacked the coherence and elaboration of its authoritarian rival, but it has provided an
ideological alternative in the Dominican political arena. Where the conservatives
implicitly or explicitly favored a hierarchical society in which the classes were more or
57
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less strictly constituted along ethnic or racial lines, the liberals tried to incorporate all
classes and colors into one project of dominicanidad or dominicanness.
The author contends that the other part of the answer to questions concerning the
influence of dominant anti-Haitian ideology on popular culture can be found in the
history of the border trade. Haitian traders traveled from market to market throughout the
Dominican countryside with their merchandise loaded on mules.61 Professional
merchants also made regular visits to Haiti. Beyond the control of the two states, a border
society came into existence, which followed its own logic and possessed its own
dynamics.62 In 2010, the market at the border reported US$143.85 millions in sales, a
sign of the strength in the bilateral business.63
Furthermore, Baud argues that the Dominican population seems largely to have
ignored the strong anti-Haitian bias, which developed in intellectual and political circles
during this period. That is not to say that there is no awareness of racial differences, but
that it goes in a different direction.64 He notes:
Many Dominicans accept and sometimes pride themselves on their mixed descent. They
convert the term indio, which has been considered above all as a denial of the African
heritage in Dominican culture, into a proof of the specific mixed character of the
Dominican population. Few Dominicans hesitate in admitting that, in practice the
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Dominican population is a mixed one. It is worth noting that this attitude is especially
apparent among the poorer classes living in both rural and urban areas. This suggests that
racial attitudes in the Dominican Republic are, at least partly, class related. In contrast to
the situation, in for example, Europe, where racist ideas and attitudes originate among the
poor or lower middle classes who feel threatened by immigrants, in the Dominican
Republic they spring from the elite. 65
Thus, in the context of the lack of opposition to the Court’s decision, the previous
passage illustrates the complexities of defining the Dominican identity as white and/or
black. Baud notes here that there are groups of the population that accept and take pride
in their mixed race. But the elite’s categorization of Haitians as the ones to be feared,
have stopped the lower classes from seeing the results of the Court ruling and thus,
mobilizing against its implementation. In this respect, in describing the forging of a
national identity in the Dominican Republic, Michael Baud argues that historians and
social scientists too often interpret ethnic and nationalist ideologies expressed by elites as
representative of popular perception.
Apart from the ethnic dimension, there is a nationalist dimension worth discussing
briefly. Nationalists consider foreign powers to have conspiratorial interests in the
Dominican Republic’s internal affairs. The nationalist debate diverts attention from
domestic problems, including political corruption.66 Second, there is the ever-present
concern over the increasing influence of the United States in Dominican politics and
society. For example, the Ambassador of the Dominican Republic to Spain, Cesar
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Medina asserts that the accusations of human rights violations against the Dominican
Republic are part of an international campaign to tarnish the country’s international
image. Cardinal Lopez Rodriguez concurs with this argument and adds that the NGOs
that are working with those denationalized are a “plague” to the country and are financed
by the American government.67 Threats to sovereignty have been a major issue in the
Dominican Republic. The country has been occupied by foreign powers for a total of 35
years since 1822-by Haiti between 1822 and 1844, Spain between 1861 and 1865, and
twice by the United States, from 1916 to 1924 and 1965 to 1966. International agencies
and foreign governments had a significant input into Dominican affairs for most of the
twentieth century. As late as 1940, the Dominican customs administrator was an
American nominated by the United States president, a hangover from the 1910
American-Dominican Convention.68
Kathryn Sikkink offers a model of state acceptance of human rights norms. In the
first stage the state denies the legitimacy of accusations and refuses to cooperate with any
international human rights pressures. In the second stage, the state would accept the
legitimacy of international human rights practices and will cooperate with the ratification
of the relevant human rights treaties, but not change domestic repressive practices. In the
final stage, the state accepts that gross violations of human rights will no longer be an
67
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issue solely within its domestic jurisdiction and provides concrete responses to
international pressures that change domestic human rights practices.69 In this case the
first two stages are merged: the Dominican Republic has denied external accusations
even while it cooperates with international human rights treaties, but the Dominican
Republic has not moved to the last stage of Sikkink’s model. The denationalization
problem comes in the heels of international charges of Haitian “slavery” on Dominican
sugar plantations and pressure on various Dominican governments from U.S. human
rights organizations, such as America’s Watch, to improve the terms in which the Haitian
question have been discussed within the country. The Haitian situation became so bad
that in 1983 the International Labor Office (ILO), upon the request of the British –based
Anti-Slavery Society, sent an investigative mission to the Dominican Republic to explore
the charges of inhumane treatment and near slave-like control of the workers. Later, in
1983, the ILO released findings that embarrassed the government, but did little to
alleviate the plight of the Haitians.70 But foreign criticism has invoked a defensive
attitude in the Dominican Republic, especially among the elite, which considers the
Haitian question as a threat to Dominican national identity. It confirms the historical
suspicion that foreign powers disregard Dominican identity and favor the unification of
the island. In this way it has provoked a more paranoid and vehement anti-Haitianism,
sometimes mixed with anti-imperialist rhetoric.
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As the history of anti-Haitianism suggests, the anti-Haitian sentiment has become
deeply rooted in the Dominican elite. Therefore, it is not surprising to see the nationalist
reaction to the Court’s decision. International human rights pressure is not only seen as
an intervention in domestic affairs, but also as an intrusion in the definition of Dominican
identity. The role that the media has played in providing biased information has only
worsened the issue, with journalists and public figures that oppose denationalization
being labeled as “traitors” by the nationalist elite.71 Given that the majority of the
population does not favor Haitian immigration, they accept as valid the arguments that
justify the Court ruling as a protection against the immigration of undocumented Haitians.
Howard says that racialized politics are likely to dominate during moments when it
becomes politically expedient to resurrect traditional racial and national rivalries, and
analyzing the situation in the Dominican Republic it is evident that the Court decision has
come to do just that.72
Even if Dominicans opposed the Court ruling, it should be noted that Dominicans
do not in general think that they can influence politics. Dark-skinned Dominicans rarely
identify their lack of civil and political rights with their race, and rarer still do they
politically organize in an attempt to improve their status.73 Not only does this limit the
possibility of any participatory oriented citizenship, but it also impedes the ability of
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groups to monitor and prevent violations of civil and political rights within these
communities. In a survey conducted in 1994, 49.2 percent of those interviewed believed
that the majority of Dominicans never or almost never have a means of influencing those
in power.74 Whether this is the case or not what is important is that Dominicans believe
that the majority of their compatriots have limited or no means of affecting politics,
indicating that there is a sense that the majority of citizens are incapable of asserting their
legal rights and civic responsibilities. Other alarming results from this survey are that
75.3 percent believes that there is no equality before the law for poor and rich people.
According to Anthony Spanakos, this widespread lack of faith in the judiciary system and
the police supports the claim that citizen rights are perceived as particular, rather than
universal rights.
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Chapter 4
Case study: China
In the study of international human rights pressures, the case of China comes to
the fore as a country that has been under significant pressure to reform its human rights
practices. With regards to China, the international community has not been shy in
denouncing abuses, and bargaining with the country to secure the protection of Chinese
citizens that face repression. Besides the involvement of human rights organizations and
the bilateral efforts undertaken by countries like the United States, improvements in the
protection of human rights in China have been hard to achieve. After decades of
involvement on the issue, one would expect greater results. What explains China’s
resistance to human rights pressure? In this chapter, following my hypothesis, I analyze
the roles played by culture and public opinion in affecting human rights reform. I will
first look at the current state of human rights in China, and then I will discuss the forms
of international pressure that the country has been exposed to. Lastly, I will analyze the
challenges that have made compliance with human rights norms and treaties, difficult to
accomplish.
Human Rights Issues
The People’s Republic of China is an authoritarian state located in East Asia. It is
a single party state in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the principal
authority. For millennia, China’s political system was based on hereditary monarchies,
known as dynasties. As Angle and Svensson note, during the last years of the Qing
dynasty (1900-1911), the early signs of rights discourse started appearing in China in
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writings published by Chinese students who had studied in Japan. In these writings the
students reveal conscious attempts to critically reflect on the Chinese ethical and political
heritage in light of the new political situation in which China found itself at the turn of
the last century.1 After World War II, the communists under Mao Zedong established an
autocratic socialist system that imposed strict controls over everyday life and cost the
lives of tens of millions of people. As Mao attempted to impose communism, he launched
the “Cultural Revolution,” a movement that paralyzed China politically and significantly
affected the country economically and socially.2
Mao’s goal was to eradicate all threats that could restore capitalism in China. This
movement spread violent struggles around the country; millions of people were
persecuted and suffered a wide range of abuses including public humiliation, arbitrary
imprisonment, torture and seizure of property.3 A large segment of the population was
forcibly displaced, most notably urban youth were transferred to rural regions. During the
Cultural Revolution, China became one of the most isolated states, cutting all of its ties to
the outside world. China recalled all of its ambassadors from abroad and no direct flights
linked Beijing to any of the major cities of Asia.4
With Mao’s death in 1976, China slowly started to reform internally and to
improve its relations with the rest of the world. In 1978, with Deng Xiaoping in power
1
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the CCP introduced revolutionary policies, which involved new foreign trade, investment,
and borrowing arrangements, the training of Chinese students abroad and the importation
of foreign ideas to demonstrate that under the guidance of the CCP the country could
modernize.5 In the course of the 1980s its GDP doubled, and foreign trade rose from
$38.1 billion in 1980, to $69.66 billion in 1985.6 As a result of these policies, within a
few years many aspects of the Maoist legacy were cast aside and China began to
participate in the international community.
Membership in international organizations rapidly advanced. In 1980, China
joined the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, it also expressed an interest
in becoming a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) a
multilateral agreement regulating international trade, and in 1986 it was granted observer
status.7 In 1986, China also joined the Asian Development Bank. By 1989 Beijing had
overtaken New Delhi in becoming the world’s largest recipient of official bilateral and
multilateral aid, receiving almost $2.2 billion a year,8 and in 1991 it joined the Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.9 This was, according to analysts, a clear
sign of Beijing’s need for economic and social development, and also of the fast growth
the country was undergoing.
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China became increasingly active in international human rights work in the UN
during the 1980s: it became a member of the UN’s Human Rights Commission in 1982,
and in 1986 it signed the Convention against Torture, although on ratification in 1988 it
chose to opt out of Article 28 of the provision that allowed the Committee to undertake a
confidential inquiry into evidence of the systematic use of torture.10 Although the country
was showing more international involvement, Angle and Svensson suggest that human
rights remained off limits in the domestic discourse.11 In the late 1980s, however, as
China experienced a period of political liberalization that culminated in the spring of
1989, academics and others began to debate human rights.
Dingxin Zhao notes that as China reformed it faced the challenge of determining
the scope of its political and economic reforms. In April 1989, Hu Yaobang, a former
CCP General Secretary passed away and his death triggered a series of protests in Beijing.
Hu was a liberal reformer who was forced to resign after losing a power struggle with
hardliners over the direction of political and economic reform.12 University students
marched and gathered in Tiananmen Square to mourn his death, and a democracy
movement of unprecedented scale developed, as first students and then ordinary citizens
took to the streets.13 Millions of students called for government accountability, freedom
of the press and freedom of speech. The peaceful protests lasted through April, and at the
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start of the protests the government took a conciliatory stance toward the protesters, but a
compromise was never reached. As time was passing by and the movement did not want
to lose momentum, the students organized a hunger strike that started on May 13, and
within two days 3,000 students were fasting in Tiananmen Square.14
The Chinese government rapidly reacted to the hunger strike and organized a
dialogue with the movement’s leadership to convince the students to leave Tiananmen
Square. In just two days, May 15, the President of the former Soviet Union Mikhail
Gorbachev was visiting China for the first time in thirty years. This official visit marked
the ending of hostile relations between the two countries.15 The dialogue between the
government and the student movement failed, and the students remained at Tiananmen
Square throughout Gorbachev’s visit. As the hunger strike continued, tensions escalated
and 300,000 military troops were deployed to the area and martial law was imposed.16
As Rosemary Foot asserts, the Chinese government’s authorization of the use of
deadly force on June 4th 1989 against the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square
accomplished in one stroke what unrest in Tibet, earlier student demonstrations, the
arrests of political activists, and reports of torture had failed to achieve: international
attention became focused on human rights violations in China.17
After years of isolationism China’s open door policies came to reveal the human
rights atrocities that China was capable of. China’s brutal handling of the protests
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horrified the international community. In providing an account of the weeks and months
after the events in Tiananmen Square, Foot explains that Western and Japanese
governmental responses were well coordinated, supported by the evidence of abuse and
the leadership of the U.S., European countries and Japan.18 Multilateral sanctions of both
a symbolic and material kind were imposed on China and hurt it economically, politically,
and in terms of its international image. This propelled China along a path that began with
denial of human rights abuses and claims of state sovereignty and noninterference.
Scholars note that it is likely that thousands of people were killed in the
suppression of the democracy movement on June 4th; though no official or reliable
figures are available, tens of thousands of people were arrested. The regime defended its
actions by describing the movement as a “counterrevolutionary rebellion” and those
killed and arrested as “counterrevolutionaries” and “hooligans.”19 It dismissed foreign
criticism as interference in its internal affairs and rejected any charges of human rights
violations. In view of its increasing incorporation into the international human rights
regime, however, it did not dismiss the language of human rights but instead insisted that
China itself was the true defender of human rights, that foreign human rights concern was
bogus and insincere, and that the students had been imbued with bourgeois understanding
of human rights that needed to be corrected and replaced by a Marxist one.20
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Foot notes that China’s discourse on human rights during these years, put the
emphasis on attacking its critics for interference in its domestic affairs or for slandering
the country. In addition, however, it began to respond to the accusations against it and
tried to protect itself as playing a constructive global role through its support of
international human rights instruments.21 As noted above, Beijing had started to be more
open about the problem of the use of torture in China at the time of its signature of the
convention.
Since the Tiananmen crisis the international community has constantly criticized
China’s human rights records. Amnesty International’s 2013 report on China emphasized
the Chinese authorities’ “stranglehold” on political activists, human rights defenders and
online activists, subjecting many to harassment, intimidation, arbitrary detention and
enforced disappearance. According to the report, people were frequently charged with
“endangering state security,” “inciting subversion of state power” and “leaking state
secrets,” and were sentenced to long prison terms, in many cases for posting blogs online
or communicating information overseas that was deemed sensitive.22
The report also points out that authorities budgeted over 701 billion Yuan
(approximately US$112 billion) to maintain public security, an increase of over 30 billion
from 2011.23 This increase in the budget can be associated with the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) leadership transition that took place in March 2013. As the result of this
transition Xi Jinping holds the three most powerful positions as CCP General Secretary,
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State President and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. It seems that in
anticipation of the leadership transition, Chinese authorities felt the need to crackdown on
dissidents who might present some challenges to the transition.
Similarly, the U.S. Department of State 2013 human rights report on China,
highlights the continuation of repression and coercion, particularly against organizations
and individuals involved in civil and political rights advocacy. For example, in May 2013
authorities in Sichuan Province detained and beat lawyers Tang Jitian and Jiang Tianyong
as they attempted to visit a black jail in Ziyang that reportedly holds followers of the
banned Falun Gong movement.24 In the section on torture and degrading treatment the
report offers a grim picture of the treatment that detainees are subjected to. Numerous
former prisoners and detainees reported that they were beaten, force fed, tortured with
electric batons and held in prolonged solitary confinement. The report also describes the
conditions in penal institutions for both political prisoners and criminal offenders as harsh
and degrading; inadequate food, overcrowding and poor sanitation were mentioned as the
main issues.25
Surveying both reports it becomes clear that improvements in the state of human
rights in China has not met the expectations of the international actors involved in the
matter. Chinese authorities have become adept at navigating accusations of human rights,
from denying the existence of political prisoners, asserting that authorities detained
persons not for their political or religious views but because they violated the law, to
refusing international humanitarian organizations access to political prisoners. This
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makes one wonder, what has been the role of the international community in pressuring
China to reform its human rights practices? What have been the successes and failures?
International Pressure
Has China been heavily pressured by the international community? Due to
China’s isolationism during the Cultural Revolution the international community did not
have the mechanisms to effect pressure. Also at that time the international human rights
regime was in its early stages which limited its effectiveness. As China re-entered the
world scene in the 1980s, and now with a more developed human right s regime,
criticism and pressure were at an all time high. In analyzing international human rights
pressure on China, I will focus on the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square crisis because it
was a critical event that gathered broad international attention, not only at the moment,
but also in the following years. The repercussions have increased human rights reporting
in the country, and the international community’s response has been unparalleled.
Following the Tiananmen crisis, the U.S. suspended all sales of weapons and of
exchanges between military leaders, and banned all exchanges with the Chinese
government above the level of assistant secretary, halted the implementation of a SinoAmerican agreement on nuclear cooperation that had been agreed to, and instructed its
representatives at the World Bank and Asian Development Bank to postpone
consideration of new loans to China.26
Foot describes other forms of pressure: NGOs kept up the pressure. Human
Rights Watch/Asia in an open letter called for an even tougher response, such as the
recall of the U.S. ambassador and the revoking of China’s Most Favored Nation status,
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which I will discuss later in this section. The U.S. Congress at the end of June 1989,
pressured by human rights groups, Chinese students in the U. S., and large parts of the
press, sought to broaden these sanctions, introducing a conditional element in its
legislation that required either that the president certify, before the lifting of such
measures, that China had made “progress on a program of political reform” or that he
would waive sanctions only for reasons of “national security.” That bill passed in the
House 418 to 0 votes. However, the president was reluctant to have his hands tied on a
foreign policy issue and, working with the Senate, substituted a phrase that made clear
the President could lift sanctions if it was in the “national interest,” a much broader
authority than that offered in the House bill.27
Beginning in July 1991, with the arrival of an Australian human rights delegation,
foreign delegations arrived in China prepared to take Beijing to task for its disregard of
human rights.28 Andrew Nathan reports about high-level visitors to China:
From 1991 onward an endless procession of important visitors made public and private
representations on human rights, including the French prime minister, the Japanese prime
minister, two Australian parliamentary delegations, many U.S. congressional delegations,
a European Community (EC) delegation, the Polish foreign minister, a Canadian
parliamentary delegation, a delegation of EC ambassadors visiting Tibet, and German
Chancellor Helmut Kohl.29
One assessment of the economic cost to China has estimated that commitments of
new bilateral foreign assistance declined from $3.4 billion in 1988 to $1.5 billion in 1989
and $0.7 billion in 1990 and that, on the basis of a 20 percent annual increase in aid
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commitments, Tiananmen cost China some $11 billion in bilateral aid over four years.30
From the start of the Tiananmen crisis, American officials had indicated in various ways
their concern not to alienate or isolate a country as important as China. As Foot asserts,
the first 18 months after this crisis marked the height of global criticism of China’s
human rights record, but the years 1992 through 1995 gave some indication of the
difficulties that would be faced by those who wished to move China beyond tactical
concessions towards genuine acceptance of the validity of some of the core human rights
norms.31 Major Western states, together with Japan, continued to reduce the bilateral
pressure, for economic and strategic reasons, and China’s recapturing of its high
economic growth rates from 1992 “enhanced its ability to pose policy dilemmas for those
interested in competing in the Chinese market, as well as for weaker countries that were
ready to benefit from China’s economic dealings with them.”32
Despite ongoing reports of China’s human rights transgressions, economic
relations between the United States and China have continued to expand. In 1994 the
GATT culminated in the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). China was
not admitted as a founding member of the WTO because the U.S. and other European
states requested changes in the Chinese economy before accepting it as a member. These
conditions included tariff reductions, open markets and industrial policies.33
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As part of the GATT many countries granted each other most-favored-nation
status (MFN), which means the recipient country receives preferential trade treatments.
After the Tiananmen Square crisis the U.S. made China’s MFN status contingent on
human rights improvements. As a result of this policy China’s MFN status would be
reviewed yearly.34 In 1994, the United States decided to end the connection between
China’s human rights record and MFN status. This was particularly significant because of
China’s increasing role in the international political economy. The United States became
China’s second largest trading partner, for both exports and imports. Muravchik, for
example, concluded that in regards to China, the United States favored economics over
human rights issues to the point of “coddling China.”35
In the debate leading to the decision to end the connection between MFN status
and human rights, some writers, including Harland and Simon, maintained that the most
effective way to promote U.S. - China relations was through the reciprocal opening of
markets and the freedom to conduct business in those markets.36 Following the liberalist
tradition, these authors recommended that U.S. economic engagement with China was the
most viable measure to promote political reform in China and to sustain U.S.- China
bilateral relations. Increased economic relations with China would then serve as a catalyst
for the expansion of China’s political, human rights, and economic reforms. The opening
34
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of peaceful relations among countries through economic exchange was also highlighted
in the U.S. - China policy position of Laura D’Andrea Tyson, who argued that U.S.
revocation of China’s MFN status would impede the progress of China’s democratic
reform.37
As Morris explains, scholars of political and economic liberalism stressed that
U.S. economic engagement with states would enhance the welfare of all, and would
therefore hasten the pace of political and human rights reforms in China and elsewhere
throughout the world.38 U.S. trade with China, for example, was considered to be the
right thing to do because the concept of freedom of choice that comes in a free-market
economy would pave the way for further individual political rights and freedoms.
In analyzing the factors that led to China’s renewal of MFN status, Morris argues
that complex interdependence influenced the U.S. shift in China policy from 1993 to
1994. Channels of formal and informal contacts between and among multinational
corporations, international organizations, and the world’s elite had factored into the 1994
decision. As well, linkages that had been formed between U.S. and Chinese corporations
would have been severed had President Clinton decided to base MFN renewal on China’s
human rights records.39
Additionally, Morris points out that economic and ideological solidarity in the
Asian region had a significant effect on the U.S. decision to separate MFN and China’s
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human rights.40 She adds that Asian countries acted as one with regard to their strong
stance on an Asian interpretation of human rights, an interpretation which promoted the
realist proposition of cultural relativism and which emphasized the sovereign rights of
nations. “The unity of the Asian countries in challenging the Western interpretation of
human rights provides evidence of the resistance to comply with international human
rights, not only specifically from China, but more broadly, within the region”41 says
Morris.
External pressures have caused Beijing to respond defensively and sometimes in
denial, but its responses have not yet transformed China into a society that upholds
human rights. In 1999, a study of China’s compliance with the international human rights
regime since 1989, noted that China had become more compliant, but its compliance did
not result from internalized, learned behaviors.42 Beijing has become adept at offering
gestures of compliance in exchange for other benefits, status and prestige among them,
which, according to Kent the government seeks. While this had resulted in increased
attention to human rights, Kent concluded that:
…despite their best efforts, UN human rights bodies and the broader international human
rights community have not succeeded in breaching the divide between China’s
international human rights policy and its domestic human rights practice, but they are
slowly making some inroads.43
Today, widespread respect for fundamental human rights is still absent in China.
The international community has not continued to exert pressure on China to improve its
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human rights practices. Countries, international organizations and NGOs have only
focused on naming and shaming, but no targeted policies like the ones put in place after
Tiananmen are in effect. According to Kent, the 1994 decision to de-link MFN status
and human rights, combined with the May 2000 decision by the U.S. government to grant
China permanent normal trade relations, has placed the cause of international human
rights in the hands of both private and public international actors. These international
actors on human rights issues include U.S. multinational corporations, their partners and
suppliers, as well as international governmental organizations.44

The Domestic Environment: Explanations for the Weak Effectiveness of
International Pressure
Public Opinion
Public opinion in China is hard to assess because of China’s isolation during the
Cultural Revolution, and after its open door policies, China has remained an authoritarian
society in which the Chinese regime does not subject itself to dialogue with or
accountability toward the people. But if events like the Tiananmen crisis and the
subsequent repression of political dissidents and Internet censorship suggest, Chinese
society is slowly changing and standing up for its rights. In the aftermath of Tiananmen
NGO activity increased dramatically in China. For example, Human Rights Watch
opened an office in Hong Kong in October 1990, the destination of a number of Chinese
dissidents. The work of NGOs has been crucial in advocating for human rights, collecting
information and spreading the ideas of respect for human rights. But as the U.S. State
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Department’s report highlighted, human rights NGOs face a great amount of scrutiny and
harassment by the Chinese state, actions that significantly limit the impact of their work.
Zhan Ning states that the concept of public opinion was introduced in China from
the West at the end of the nineteenth century. Before then, one finds the Chinese idea of
Yanlu, which conventionally designates the “channels through which criticism and
suggestions can be transmitted to the authorities.”45 According to Ning, the new elites,
who do not question the legitimacy of the government, sometimes resort to this ancient
notion in order to transmit their criticism in an acceptable form. The notion of public
opinion in China has a range of meanings, both because of the number of translations of
the expression and because of the evolution of the historical context. Mao, in his own
language, distinguished the “people’s will” (renmin de yiyuan) from opinion (yulun).46
Going back to the literature review, in a study that analyzed public support for
international human rights institutions, Min Zhou found that public support for global
institutionalization of human rights is not universal and may be related to a broader social
context.47 Zhou notes that people with certain social, economic, and demographic
characteristics are more likely to show support for international human rights institutions.
For instance, in China the level of support decreases as the level of education attained
rises (see figure 4.1). The United States and China therefore, display a sharp contrast in
the effect of education. While the higher level of education attained increases the level of
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support in the United States, this group shows less support in China. Zhou concludes that
the declining level of support could be related to the notion of western proprietorship of
human rights, and that this notion puts the global movement at risk because it may render
obsolete the developing global culture of human rights. Zhou continues that developing
countries and non-liberal states often criticize human rights advocates as invasive of
sovereignty, the result of imbalances of power and ethnocentrism.48
Figure 4.1 Chinese Public Support for International Human Rights Institutions Vs.
American’s Responses

Source: Min Zhou “Public Support for International Human Rights Institutions: A CrossNational and Multilevel Analysis” Sociological Forum Vol. 28, No. 3 (2013) p525-548.
The apathy of the rising middle class can be explained by a study that suggests
that the members of that group have displayed either a lack of interest in politics, or a
preference for political stability rather than rapid democratization, as a result of economic
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reforms. The rising middle class has been careful not to jeopardize their economic gains,
and have expressed some fear of grassroots democracy.49
Public opinion in China is affected by censorship and the fact that the state still
directly controls the largest mass media outlets, pressures other media regarding sensitive
stories, and imposes severe measures against its critics. King et al, provide an important
point when they argue that the purpose of the Chinese censorship program is to reduce
the probability of collective action by clipping social ties whenever any collective
movements are in evidence or expected.50 My view is that if there is a need for
censorship it is because people are changing and are demanding that their rights be
respected. This also has to do with the expansion of the Chinese middle class. Perhaps
some of this is attributable to the work of human rights organizations, although it is hard
to tell.
The vastness of the population in China makes it difficult to establish effective
internal networks of opposition that may benefit from the support offered by external
advocates of reform. Economic growth is uneven, so what appears to be significant
development is, in fact, limited to a small segment of the population- “China has yet to
achieve the level of growth necessary to lift enough boats”- so popular demand for more
extensive rights has yet to increase significantly.51
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As discussed in this section, public opinion in China is hard to assess because it is
a relatively new concept. In addition, state repression and censorship make it very
difficult for people to express their opinions, much less to criticize the government and
push for human rights. The fact that under these conditions there are many activists and
dissidents that risk their lives to have their voices heard is an indication that things might
be moving in the right direction.
Chinese Culture: A Challenge to Human Rights
In the debate about human rights, China has often responded that human rights are
a creation of the West and that pressure to comply with human rights international norms
are a tool of Western imperialism. The idea that all human beings, simply because they
are human, have certain inalienable rights, was essentially foreign to Asian political
thought. As Angle and Svensson have explained classical Confucianism, along with most
other Chinese schools of thought, denies that the sole unit of ethical or political
assessment is the individual. Instead, theorizing begins from relationships and roles
within relationships, “Confucian thinkers stress reciprocal responsibilities rather than
correlated rights and duties.”52 Therefore, the responsibilities of the individual toward
society are emphasized over the rights of the individual.
As a result of the international criticism, the Chinese political leadership decided
that more research on human rights issues was needed and that its official human rights
policy needed to be refined and strengthened. To this end, human rights research both
52
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within government organs and within academic institutions, has been encouraged and
supported. The first and most visible result of the government’s own efforts was the
publishing of a white paper on human rights in 1991, which was followed over the years
by a whole range of other white papers.53 The 1991 white paper outlined the Chinese
official position on human rights, setting the parameters for both the official and other
more academic discussions. Rather than react in shame to criticisms, Beijing responded
with defiance and with some consistency in its response. In a sequence of white papers
concerning human rights, Beijing explained all that it had done to promote human rights
and also articulated a view of human rights that has several hallmarks:
1. Conditions were worse in China before 1949 than since.
2. China is still a developing country and must cultivate human rights in a way that is
consistent with Chinese culture and the specific conditions in China.
3. Consequently, China emphasizes the right to subsistence and development as the
foundation for other civil and political rights.
4. Legal institutions exist in China to safeguard civil and political rights, but the rights
of the majority should not be undermined by the claims of the minority.
5. China does respect universal human rights, but believes that these rights must be
determined in a cooperative manner with other states, not imposed by some states on
others.
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6. Western states have tried to usurp the issue of human rights to use it as a political
lever against developing states, interfering in their internal affairs in a culturally
hegemonic fashion. 54
Some authors, for example, Alan Wachman have suggested that the cynicism
Beijing has shown in the face of criticisms about China’s human rights records may stem
from a perception that foreign critics fundamentally oppose the development of China
and have other political motives, for example turning China into a democracy. China has
responded in a way that is consistent with the second, “denial” phase of Risse and
Sikkink’s spiral model.55 The Chinese government has made clear that, while it accepts
the concept of universal human rights, it rejects the Western definition and imposition of
those rights. In an attempt to avoid having standards imposed on it by other states, say
Risse and Sikkink, China wraps itself in the language of universality, while arguing that:
China cannot copy the mode of human rights development of the developed Western
countries, nor it can copy the methods of other developing countries. China can only start
from its own reality and explore a road with its own characteristics…China has…found a
road to promoting and developing human rights which is in line with the country’s
reality.56
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Has international pressure worked? Beijing has used “cosmetic gestures” to
impress foreigners.57 This corresponds with Risse and Sikkink’s third stage of the spiral
model, the stage of “tactical concessions.” At that stage, governments
..changed their human rights practices only to gain access to the material benefits of
foreign aid or to be able to stay in power in the face of strong domestic opposition. In fact,
the process of human rights change almost always begins with some instrumentally or
strategically motivated adaptation by national governments to growing domestic and
transnational pressures.58
Among these gestures has been the regular release of political prisoners at critical
times. Between 1990 and 1991 in an attempt to influence the debate in the USA about
whether to grant MFN status to China, the Chinese government released 881 individuals
associated with the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, martial law was lifted in
Beijing, Fang Lizhi- a noted senior activist who had taken refuge in the US embassy- was
permitted to leave the country, Han Dongfang-a lobour activist dying in prison- was
released and China offered the U.S. assurances that it would not prohibit individuals
“from going abroad for political reasons.”59
Again in 1993 China released Wei Jingsheng, a long-held prisoner, when the
International Olympic Committee was preparing to make its decision about which city
would host the 2000 summer Olympics. Other prisoners were released on the eve of
President Clinton’s decision about whether to grant MFN status to China in 1993. In
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neither case did the releases buy for China the approval it sought. Both men were actually
arrested again. Of those released, some were jailed again.60
One explanation of why Beijing has used tactical concessions is that external
pressure is not applied consistently or uniformly by all states. Once a state is not under
constant pressure, the process of reform may slow, be reversed, or stall at the concession
stage. Risse and Sikkink write of certain “blocking factors” that impede socialization to
international norms. Citing the case of Indonesia, Risse and Sikkink explain that the
effectiveness of external pressures applied by transnational network
…was limited by countervailing national norms and value structures which emphasized
sovereignty and domestic cohesion more than human rights principles. Similar
constraining appeals to a narrowly defined sense of cultural and territorial nationalism
were made by Hispanic elites in Guatemala when they felt threatened by network
influence.61
In studying the effectiveness of shaming to promote human rights in China, Alan
Wachman considers that since the country made the transition from totalitarianism to
authoritarianism the regime is still relatively uneasy about preserving its legitimacy, so is
eager to preserve domestic order and reluctant to introduce potentially destabilizing
freedoms.62
As Wachman suggests, at this point, Beijing has discovered that, while greater
international involvement could bring rich rewards, it could also reduce a government’s
ability to maintain control over both domestic and external issues. Beijing’s participation
in human rights bodies and signature of some of the international conventions, notably
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the one against torture, suggests a growing responsiveness to international human rights
norms and the realization that full participation in the international community required
adherence to certain minimal rules of behavior.63
As I have discussed above, it seems that Beijing is prepared to sacrifice a degree
of international prestige for the sake of sovereignty. Andrew Nathan rejects the idea that
China is not susceptible to outside pressure on the grounds that it must preserve “face”
after frequent infringements of its sovereignty. 64 My assumption is that China has
behaved as a realist power, making concessions it perceived as necessary to influence
states with which it was interacting and not making them when they were not seen as
necessary.
When multilateral sanctions were imposed on China in the aftermath of the
Tiananmen crisis, the impact on China’s international relations was definitely severe,
forcing the country to make some concessions in response to criticism of its human rights
abuses. As Foot has pointed out, “the country was damaged economically and
psychologically and the great power status that it craved seemed further out of reach.”65
Beijing was forced to respond, and even though egregious human rights abuses continue
to this day, China realized that the world is watching and that human rights violations
will not go unpunished. Morris sustains that complex interdependence played a big role
in the U.S.’s decision to grant MFN status to China, and I believe that condition is still
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prevalent today.66 Economic relations between China and the rest of the world are too
intertwined to suggest the imposition of sanctions to curtail human rights violations.
Clearly, China benefits from this complex interdependence and engages in tactical
concessions to appear engaged in addressing its human rights issues.
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Conclusion
Despite the clear policy implications and mounting consequences of international
human rights pressure, we are only beginning to understand how such pressures affect
state compliance. How we think about compliance and the impact of international
pressure is essential for devising more effective human rights policies. In this thesis, I
have set out to study the impact of international human rights pressure on state
compliance. In investigating the impact of human rights pressure on states, I
hypothesized that certain conditions were helpful. The first condition is the absence of a
strong public opinion and/or cultural sentiment against what the pressuring entities are
trying to achieve. The second condition is dependency: dependent countries are more
vulnerable to economic and military threats, and thus are more likely to comply with
international pressures.
Analyzing the cases of the Dominican Republic and China, I have been able to
show that the existence of a strong public opinion and/ or cultural sentiment against
human rights, have negatively affected the international pressure that has been exerted
over these states to reform their human rights practices and to comply with international
norms and treaties. In the Dominican Republic, human rights abuses against Haitian
immigrants have been denounced since the 1930s, more specifically after the massacre in
1937. In the subsequent years, reports about the living conditions in the sugar cane fields,
mass deportations and issues concerning the birth registrations of Dominicans of Haitian
descent have prompted the visits of international human rights bodies, recommendations
and a lot of criticism from the international community. In other words, the practice of
naming and shaming has led the discussion of human rights violations in the Dominican
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Republic. The absence of a concerted effort to address this issue, even as thousands of
people risk being in the limbo of statelessness, is simply shocking, and it begs the
question, why the international community has not exerted pressure in other ways, given
that current strategies have failed to produce results? The only answer is a combination of
apathy and the lack of leadership to lead the efforts to push for reform.
Meanwhile approximately 250,000 people remain stateless. Getting the
Dominican government to act is proving a challenging task. If the international
community joined forces and decided to address this issue more seriously, those affected
could be able to continue their lives normally, and integrate as full members of society
and not as the second-class citizens they are today. The human rights situation in the
Dominican Republic requires as an immediate action bargaining with the conservative
elite that refuses to allow any change, and in the long run, the resources of the
international NGOs, and bilateral aid programs, are better spent on programs that
promote diversity, anti-discrimination and democracy in the country. Such programs may
raise awareness about Dominicans’ racial identity and empower the poor and middle
classes.
In the case of China, the aftermath of Tiananmen saw an increase in reporting
about human rights conditions, and significant amounts of pressure in the first years after
the crisis, but the international community gradually moved away from putting enough
pressure to effect change. Today, the horrors lived by activists, opponents of the
government and prisoners are well known. Yet, the international community has
restricted its actions to pointing fingers and criticizing. The U.S. and other countries have
attempted to promote human rights through bilateral relations, and public diplomacy, but
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these efforts have only resulted in tactical concessions, and no major changes have been
registered. Economic ties between China and the rest of the world have now become too
tight for countries to consider hurting their own economies to promote human rights
abroad. This is a very disappointing realization to make given the successes the
international human rights regime has been able to produce when the different actors get
together and act as one.
As my research has suggested, Chinese culture has played a big role in the
resistance to comply with international norms. Therefore, I believe that the international
community should find a way to reconcile international human rights values and Chinese
culture. Chinese scholars and academics in the field of human rights should be brought to
the discussion about human rights in China, to dispel the fears of outside imposition of
human rights values. The other alternative is to continue monitoring the situation to
ensure the protection of political dissidents. The international community is better off
accepting an Asian conception of human rights, and pushing for at least basic protections,
than alienating China completely and losing the chance to achieve change, even if it is
gradual.
There is very little research on the role played by mass public opinion in the field
of human rights. However, as I have discussed in this thesis there are certain links that
help explain people’s perceptions about human rights, and more specifically when there
is international pressure to ensure protection of those rights involved. In the Dominican
Republic the widespread availability of biased information affects people’s perceptions of
current events, and at the same time it makes advocating for the rights of Dominicans of
Haitian descent and Haitian immigrants a challenging task, mainly because of the lack of
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popular support. On the other hand, in China, censorship and the suppression of human
rights advocates limits the reach of human rights campaigns. Further research on this
field, could expand our knowledge of public opinion and human rights and allow for
better strategies to address this challenge.
Looking at the case of the Dominican Republic the government does not provide
a cultural response to criticism the way China does, but close examination of public
sentiment leads to the conclusion that historical racial biases have impeded the success of
international pressures to reform human rights practices. As the analysis in chapter three
suggests, the predominantly white Dominican elite has consistently enforced antiHaitianism throughout Dominican history, and its voice has been stronger in perpetuating
racial biases and division between Haitians and Dominicans. Understanding the
difference between the powerful elite and the rest of the population is crucial to see why,
pressures to overturn the Court decision, or to avert statelessness have not been well
received in the country. Statements that denounce interference in domestic affairs, uphold
sovereignty and incite nationalism are indications of the denial which the country seems
to be in, in terms of its policies against Dominicans of Haitian descent and Haitian
immigrants. Both the Dominican Republic and China have responded similarly, which is
consistent with the way states normally respond to international pressure (Chile and
Argentina in the 1970s offered similar responses). After all, states don’t usually admit to
human rights violations.
In this thesis, I have concentrated only on some of the actors that make up the
international human rights regime: international organizations, a few of the major NGOs,
regional courts and bilateral action by certain states. It is a small number of actors, but it
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has served to give some signals of the impact in this issue area, and has also helped to
illustrate how the different components of the human rights regime can operate in accord.
Future research on this subject could concentrate on the other side of the coin, which
would be the incentives domestic actors have to violate human rights. Such research
could provide valuable insight into the motivations behind the domestic resistance to
human rights pressure.
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